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ABSTRACT
Accurately analyzing graph properties of social networks is a chal-
lenging task because of access limitations to the graph data. To
address this challenge, several algorithms to obtain unbiased es-
timates of properties from few samples via a random walk have
been studied. However, existing algorithms do not consider private
nodes who hide their neighbors in real social networks, leading
to some practical problems. Here we design random walk-based
algorithms to accurately estimate properties without any problems
caused by private nodes. First, we design a random walk-based
sampling algorithm that comprises the neighbor selection to obtain
samples having the Markov property and the calculation of weights
for each sample to correct the sampling bias. Further, for two graph
property estimators, we propose the weighting methods to reduce
not only the sampling bias but also estimation errors due to private
nodes. The proposed algorithms improve the estimation accuracy
of the existing algorithms by up to 92.6% on real-world datasets.
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•General and reference→Estimation; •Mathematics of com-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have been primarily studied to un-
derstand the nature of global social structures, such as human con-
nections and behaviors [1, 9, 10, 16, 20, 29]. A widely used approach
to understand the structure is to analyze various graph properties,
such as the number of nodes (size), the average degree, and the
degree distribution. However, an accurate analysis of social graphs
is a challenging task because of access limitations to the graph data.
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Although some studies used complete graph data [1, 3, 21], all the
data is typically not available to researchers. In practical scenarios,
we sample a part of graph data through the application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) to estimate properties [9, 10]. We can obtain
unbiased estimates if users are randomly sampled; however, it is
frequently difficult to randomly assign user IDs to the APIs [6, 11].
Several algorithms [5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 28] based on the re-weighted
random walk scheme [9, 10] have been studied to address this
challenge. Many OSNs have provided APIs to return the neighbor
data of a queried user. By repeatedly utilizing this function for a
randomly selected neighbor, we obtain samples with the Markov
property via a random walk on a social network. Then, we obtain
unbiased estimates of properties by re-weighting each sample to
correct the sampling bias derived from the Markov chain analysis.
Previous studies have focused on accurate estimates with a small
number of queries because APIs are typically rate-limited [6, 11].
However, previous studies have ignored private users who do
not provide their neighbor data even if queried. Although previous
studies assume a network comprising only public userswho publish
their neighbor data, a certain percentage of private users exist in
real social networks. For example, private users were about 27% on
Facebook [4] and 34% on Pokec [25], which is an OSN in Slovakia.
Private users cause some problems for existing algorithms. For
example, how do we deal with private users in a random walk sam-
pling? If private users are sampled, we need to handle an exception
wherein the neighbor data cannot be obtained by approaches such
as returning to the public user sampled previously. However, if
such an exceptional process is performed, the Markov property of
a sample sequence cannot be guaranteed. This can prevent us from
obtaining unbiased estimates of properties. There is another serious
problem. A fast solution of problems in sampling is to not include
private users to the sample sequence; however, by not sampling
them, the sampling bias and weighting for each sample are different
from the assumptions of existing algorithms. Thus, the existing
algorithms cause estimation errors due to private users.
We aim to design re-weighted random walk algorithms consid-
ering private users to accurately estimate properties without any
problems caused by private users. To the best of our knowledge,
this study is the first to focus on the effect of private users on ran-
dom walk-based estimators. First, we make three assumptions and
define two access models (the ideal model and the hidden privacy
model), based on previous studies and our observations of real social
networks (Section 2). Then, we design sampling and estimation
algorithms based on these assumptions and access models.
This study has two main contributions. The first contribution is
to enable us to successfully perform re-weighted random walk-based
algorithms in real social networks including private users (Section 3).
We discuss the neighbor selection in a random walk by considering
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private users and derive the sampling bias of each user. Then, for
each access model, we describe the calculation of the weights to
correct the sampling bias; particularly for the hidden privacy model,
we propose a method to approximate weights with much fewer
queries than exact calculation.
The second contribution is to enable us to accurately estimate
the size and average degree of a whole social graph including private
nodes (Section 4). Existing algorithms [6, 11, 12] cause errors due
to private users because the conventional weighting aims only to
correct the sampling bias. We propose weighting methods to reduce
both sampling bias and errors due to private users. Moreover, we
theoretically explain that estimates obtained using the proposed
weighting converge to values with smaller expected errors than the
previous weighting.
Finally, we validate the theoretical claims and effectiveness of
the proposed algorithms on extensive experiments using real so-
cial network datasets (Section 5). It is important to evaluate the
performance when the assumptions are not satisfied because the
proposed algorithms are designed on some simplified assumptions.
We empirically show that the proposed algorithms perform well on
realistic datasets, such as a 92.6% improvement in the estimation
accuracy on the Pokec dataset including real private users.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Definitions and Notations
We represent a social network as a connected and undirected graph,
G = (V ,E), where V = {v1, ...,vn } denotes the set of nodes (users),
and E denotes the set of edges (friendship). Let di denote the degree
(number of neighbors) of vi and D =
∑
vi ∈V di denote the sum
of degrees. We define the average degree ofG as davд = Dn . Each
node, vi , has a privacy label, lpr i (i) ∈ {public,private}. The set of
privacy labels is denoted by Lpr i = {lpr i (i)}vi ∈V .
We refer to connected subgraphs that consist of public nodes
onG as public-clusters. Let {Ci } denote a set of public-clusters and
C∗ = (V ∗,E∗) denote the largest public-cluster. Let n∗ denote the
number of nodes in C∗, and d∗i = |{vj ∈ V ∗ |(vi ,vj ) ∈ E∗}| denote
the public-degree (the number of neighbors that publish their own
neighbors) of a node vi ∈ V ∗. Let D∗ = ∑vi ∈V ∗ d∗i denote the sum
of public-degrees. We define the average degree ofC∗ asd∗avд = D
∗
n∗ .
Let 1V ∗ (vi ) denote a function that returns 1 if vi ∈ V ∗, otherwise 0.
Example: Let vi = i (1 ≤ i ≤ 10) in Figure 1. There are three
public-clusters, C1, C2 and C3, and C1 is the largest public-cluster:
• C1 = ({4, 5, 6, 7, 9}, {(4, 5), (5, 6), (5, 7), (5, 9)})
• C2 = ({8, 10}, {(8, 10)})
• C3 = ({3}, {}).
Also, it holds n∗ = 5,d∗4 = 1,d
∗
5 = 4,d
∗
6 = 1,d
∗
7 = 1,d
∗
9 = 1.
2.2 Assumptions
We design algorithms based on the following three assumptions.
(1) The indices of all neighbors, including private neighbors, of a
queried public node are obtained. Facebook as of the previous
study [10] satisfied this assumption. We have confirmed that
Twitter as of June 2020 satisfies this assumption [26, 27].
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Figure 1: An example of a graph with privacy labels. Here,
nodes 1 and 2 are private and others are public.
(2) Each node independently becomes private with probability p,
otherwise public, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.We assume that each node
independently hides neighbors with a certain probability1.
(3) The seed of a random walk is on the largest public-cluster. We
do not consider the number of queries performed to select
the seed from nodes on the largest public-cluster, because
we consider that this number is sufficiently small.
2.3 Access Models
We do not assume the acquisition of all the graph data and their
random access. We assume that a graph G is static.
If we query a public node, the neighbor data are provided. If a
private node is queried, the neighbor data cannot be obtained2. We
consider two models for the neighbor data that are provided when
a public node, vi , is queried: ideal model and hidden privacy model.
The ideal model: Indices (IDs) and privacy labels of all neighbors
of vi are obtained. For example, when a public node 4 is queried in
Figure 1, we obtain the set {(2,private), (5,public)}. Facebook as
of the previous study [10] corresponds to this access model.
The hidden privacy model: Even though ids of all neighbors
of vi are obtained, the privacy labels are not. For example, when a
public node 4 is queried in Figure 1, we obtain the set {2, 5}. Twitter
API as of June 2020 corresponds to this model [26, 27].
2.4 Markov Chain Basics
We introduce the basics of a Markov chain for theoretical analysis
of random walk-based estimators. First, we describe the station-
ary distribution of a Markov chain, which is needed to derive the
sampling bias. Let P = {Pi, j }i, j ∈S denote the transition probability
matrix of a Markov chain on the state space, S . If πj =
∑
i ∈S πiPi, j
holds for all j ∈ S , π = {πi }i ∈S is the stationary distribution of P .
The following theorem holds for the stationary distribution π of P :
Theorem 2.1. [19] If P is ergodic (i.e., irreducible and aperiodic),
the stationary distribution, π , uniquely exists.
Then, we review the strong law of large numbers for a Markov
chain, which is needed to ensure that the sample average converges
almost surely to its expected value:
Theorem 2.2. [5, 17] Let {Xk } be an ergodic Markov chain with
the stationary distribution π on the finite state space S . For any
function f : S → R, 1r
∑r
k=1 f (Xk ) converges to
∑
i ∈S πi f (i) almost
surely as r →∞ regardless of the initial distribution of the chain.
1Intuitively, private nodes tend to have low degrees under Assumption 2, because the
degree distribution of social networks is typically biased to low degrees [1, 9, 10, 16, 20].
2The output may be an error message or an empty set.
3 RANDOMWALK SAMPLING
We design a random walk-based sampling algorithm that consists
of the neighbor selection to obtain samples having the Markov
property and the calculation of weights to correct the sampling
bias. The proofs in this section are shown in the supplement.
3.1 Transition Neighbor Selection
In a simple random walk, we move to a randomly selected neigh-
bor. If private nodes are sampled, practical problems on estimating
properties occur, because their neighbor data are unclear. For ex-
ample, we cannot simply continue the algorithm, and it is difficult
to correct the sampling bias of sampled private nodes.
We believe that it is appropriate to move to a public neighbor
randomly selected as Gjoka et al. [10] performed on Facebook3.
We design the algorithm to obtain an index sequence of r sampled
nodes, denoted by {xk }rk=1, as follows. First, we select a seed,vx1 ∈
C∗, as the first sample. Then, for 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, we randomly select
a node, u, from neighbors of the k-th sample, vxk . If u is public, we
move to u as next sample, vxk+1 ; otherwise, we randomly reselect a
neighbor ofvxk . In the ideal model, we check if a selected neighbor
u is public without an additional query. In the hidden privacy model,
we judge the privacy label of u by additionally querying u.
3.2 Sampling Bias
We derive the sampling bias caused by the designed random walk.
Let the probability that an event A will occur be denoted by Pr [A].
We define the distribution induced by the sequence of sampled
indices as πr = (Pr [xr = i])vi ∈V .
We show that each node on the largest public-cluster is sampled
in proportion to the public-degree via the designed random walk.
Lemma 3.1. πr converges to the vector π = (pi1V ∗ (vi ))vi ∈V after
many steps of the designed random walk, where pi =
d∗i
D∗ .
3.3 Public-Degree Calculation
We need to calculate the public-degree of each sample to correct
the sampling bias due to the public-degree.
In the ideal model, we can exactly calculate each public-degree
without additional query because the privacy labels of all the neigh-
bors are obtained. Conversely, in the hidden privacy model, the
exact calculation needs a considerable number of additional queries
to obtain privacy labels of all neighbors for each sample.
For the hidden privacy model, we propose a method to approxi-
mate each public-degree without additional queries by utilizing the
history of neighbor selections of the designed random walk. We
record two values for each sample vxk : the total number of success-
ful public neighbor selections, axk , and that of neighbor selections,
bxk . After sampling, each approximate value, dˆ∗xk , is calculated as
dˆ∗xk ≜ dxk
axk
bxk
.
The pseudo-code of the designed random walk with the proposed
approximation of public-degrees is shown in the supplement.
3There is no detailed discussion of the effect of private nodes on re-weighted random
walk algorithms [10]. They focused on only the part comprising public nodes.
We ensure the convergence of the approximated public-degree
after many steps of the designed random walk.
Lemma 3.2. dˆ∗xk converges to d
∗
xk for each sample,vxk , after many
steps of the designed random walk.
Then, we explain that the proposedmethod performsmuch fewer
queries than the exact method that exactly calculates the public-
degree of each sample. Here, for simplicity, we do not consider the
save of the indices of nodes queried once. Q(k) and Qˆ(k) denote
the number of queries that are performed at the k-th sample by the
exact and proposed methods, respectively. Let Q = 1r
∑r
k=1Q(k)
and Qˆ = 1r
∑r
k=1 Qˆ(k) denote the ratio of the number of queries to
the sample size of the exact and proposed methods, respectively.
Lemma 3.3. The expectations of Q and Qˆ are
∑
vi ∈V ∗ d
∗
i di
D∗ and∑
vi ∈V ∗ di
D∗ , respectively.
Lemma 3.3 implies that the proposed method performs much
fewer queries than the exact method because
∑
vi ∈V ∗ di is intu-
itively much smaller than
∑
vi ∈V ∗ d∗i di in real social networks.
4 PROPERTIES ESTIMATION
We design estimators for the size and the average degree via a
random walk designed in Section 3. We first introduce the existing
estimators and then propose estimators with improved weighting.
The proofs in this section are shown in the supplement.
4.1 Overview
Here we address a novel problem that the convergence values of
estimators have errors caused by private nodes. The conventional
estimators perform the weighting using only the public-degree to
correct the sampling bias; consequently, the estimates converge
to the properties of the largest public-cluster. When a graph com-
prises only public nodes as have been assumed in previous studies,
the convergence values are equal to the properties of the original
graph. However, when there are private nodes on a graph, the con-
vergence values typically have errors due to private nodes, or more
specifically, the value of p.
It is unclear how to reduce the errors due to the value of p. If we
know the exact value of p, we can easily correct the errors; however,
this is usually unknown. Moreover, we cannot apply existing meth-
ods to estimate the value of p based on privacy labels of samples
(Section 3.C.3 in [10], Section 3.2 in [12] and Section 4.2.3 in [23]),
because private nodes are not included in samples.
We propose the weighting methods combining the public-degree
and degree to reduce the errors of convergence values due to the
value of p. The proposed methods are based on the fact that the
public-degree follows the binomial distribution with parameters
of the degree and 1 − p regarding the set of privacy labels under
Assumption 2. Proposed estimators provide the same convergence
values when p = 0 and convergence values with smaller expected
errors when p > 0 as compared with the existing estimators.
4.2 Size Estimation
Existing estimator: The node collision (NC) algorithm is an effec-
tive estimator for the size [11, 12]. This algorithm examines sample
pairs whose ordinal numbers in the sample sequence are more than
a threshold,m, apart. Sample pairs whose ordinal numbers in the
sample sequence are sufficiently apart can be regarded as being
independently sampled [11].
Let I = {(k, l) | m ≤ |k − l | ∧ 1 ≤ k, l ≤ r } denote the set of
integer pairs that are between 1 and r and at least m away. Let
ϕk,l denote a variable which returns 1 if xk = xl (this is called a
collision), and otherwise, 0. The average of the number of collisions
ΦNCn , the average of the weights to correct the sampling bias ΨNCn ,
and a size estimate nNC obtained by NC algorithm are as follows:
ΦNCn =
1
|I |
∑
(k,l )∈I
ϕk,l , Ψ
NC
n =
1
|I |
∑
(k,l )∈I
d∗xk
d∗xl
, nNC ≜
ΨNCn
ΦNCn
It holds the following lemma expanded from the previous studies
[11, 12] which assume graph with no private nodes.
Lemma 4.1. nNC converges to size of the largest public-cluster, n∗.
We focus on the expectation of n∗ regarding the set of privacy la-
bels, Lpr i , to quantify the error between n∗ and n. Epr i [X ] denotes
the expectation of a random variableX regardingLpr i . We approxi-
mate the expectation of n∗ regarding Lpr i under the condition that
all the public nodes belong to the largest public-cluster. Under this
condition, it holds that Pr [vi ∈ V ∗] = Pr [lpr i (i) = public] = 1 − p.
The following lemma holds for the convergence value n∗:
Lemma 4.2. Under the condition that all the public nodes belong
to the largest public-cluster, we have
Epr i [n∗] = (1 − p)n.
Lemma 4.2 implies that an expected relative error of the conver-
gence value in the existing estimator is 1 − p.
Proposed estimator:We improve the weighting for each sam-
ple pair to reduce the convergence error. We define the average of
the proposed weights as Ψˆn , then our estimation value as nˆ:
Ψˆn =
1
|I |
∑
(k,l )∈I
dxk
d∗xl
, nˆ ≜
Ψˆn
ΦNCn
.
It holds the following lemma regarding the convergence values
of the proposed estimator.
Lemma 4.3. nˆ converges to n˜ = n∗
∑
vi ∈V ∗ d
∗
i di∑
vi ∈V ∗ (d∗i )2
.
When there are no private nodes onG , the following proposition
holds for each estimate and convergence value.
Proposition 4.4. When there are no private nodes on G, the two
estimation values, nNC and nˆ, are equal, and the two convergence
values, n∗ and n˜, are equal to the true value, n.
We clarify our convergence value, n˜, has the smaller expected
error for any values of p than the previous convergence value, n∗.
First, we show the following lemma:
Lemma 4.5. For any node vi ∈ V ∗, we have
Epr i [d∗i ] = (1 − p)di ,
Epr i
[(d∗i )2] = (1 − p)di [(1 − p)di + p].
Then, we approximate the expectation of n˜ regarding Lpr i by
deriving each expectation of the denominator and numerator of n˜.
Theorem 4.6. Let αp =
(1−p)∑vi ∈V (di )2∑
vi ∈V di [(1−p)di+p]
. Under the condition
that all the public nodes belong to the largest public-cluster, we have
Epr i [n˜] ≈
Epr i [n∗]Epr i [∑vi ∈V ∗ d∗i di ]
Epr i [∑vi ∈V ∗ (d∗i )2] = αpn.
Theorem 4.6 implies that our convergence value is almost equal
to the entire size because the coefficient αp is empirically almost
equal to 1 for various values of p in real social networks.
The following corollary claims that the proposed estimator im-
proves an expected convergence error for any values of p.
Corollary 4.7. Under the condition that all the public nodes
belong to the largest public-cluster, we haven − Epr i [n∗]Epr i [∑vi ∈V ∗ d∗i di ]Epr i [∑vi ∈V ∗ (d∗i )2]
 ≤ n − Epr i [n∗] .
4.3 Average Degree Estimation
Existing estimator: The Smooth algorithm [6] takes a rough es-
timate of the average degree, c , as an input and returns a more
accurate estimate. Herein, we let c to be 0 because Dasgupta et al.
concluded that small values, 0 or 1, are desirable [6].
An estimate of the average degree obtained using the Smooth
algorithm, dSmoothavд , is defined as follows:
dSmoothavд ≜
r∑r
k=1
1
d∗xk
.
It holds the following lemma derived from the previous study
[6] which assumes a graph with no private nodes.
Lemma 4.8. dSmoothavд converges to the average degree of the largest
public-cluster, d∗avд .
Then, we approximate the expectation of d∗avд regarding Lpr i .
Lemma 4.9. Under the condition that all the public nodes belong
to the largest public-cluster, we have
Epr i [d∗avд] ≈
Epr i [D∗]
Epr i [n∗] = (1 − p)davд .
Lemma 4.9 implies that an expected relative error of the conver-
gence value in the existing estimator is 1 − p.
Proposed estimator: We improve the weighting to reduce a
convergence error due to the value of p. We define our estimate as
dˆavд ≜
r∑r
k=1
1
dxk
.
The following lemma regarding our estimate holds:
Lemma 4.10. dˆavд converges to d˜avд = D
∗∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
di
.
The following proposition holds as well as Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.11. When there are no private nodes on G, two
estimates, dSmoothavд and dˆavд , are equal, and two convergence values,
d∗avд and d˜avд , are equal to the true value, davд .
The following theorem and corollary claim that the proposed
estimator improves an expected error of the convergence value.
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Theorem 4.12. Under the condition that all the public nodes belong
to the largest public-cluster, we have
Epr i [d˜avд] ≈
Epr i [D∗]
Epr i
[∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
di
] = davд .
Corollary 4.13. Under the condition that all the public nodes
belong to the largest public-cluster, we havedavд − Epr i [D
∗]
Epr i
[∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
di
]
 ≤
davд − Epr i [D∗]Epr i [n∗]
 .
4.4 Estimation in the Hidden Privacy Model
In the hidden privacy model, we calculate each estimate using the
approximated public-degree, dˆ∗xk . Even in this model, Lemmas 4.1,
4.3, 4.8, and 4.10 hold because of Lemma 3.2.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the proposed algorithms using real social network
datasets. We aim to answer the following questions:
(1) Do the proposed estimators improve the estimation accuracy
of the size and average degree for various probabilities of p?
(Section 5.2)
(2) Do the proposed estimators perform acceptably in real-world
datasets including real private users? (Section 5.3)
(3) How does the proposed public-degree calculation for the
hidden privacy model affect the estimation accuracy and
number of queries? (Section 5.4)
(4) Is the number of queries performed in the seed selection due
to private nodes is small? (Section 5.5)
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets:Weuse datasets of known size and average degree, YouTube,
Pokec, Orkut, Facebook, and LiveJournal. For these five datasets, we
focus on undirected and connected graphs by the pre-processing:
(1) removing the directions of edges if the original graphs are di-
rected and then (2) deleting the nodes that are not contained in the
largest connected component of the original graph. All the follow-
ing experiments are unaffected because the above pre-processing is
performed before setting privacy labels and any processing is not
added to the graph after the privacy labels are set. The Pokec dataset
contains all graph data of the Pokec network, including 552525 real
private users (about 33.8%) and the real privacy labels. Table 1 lists
Table 1: Datasets.
Network n davд Privacy label setting
YouTube [14] 1,134,890 5.27 based on Assumption 2
Pokec [18] 1,632,803 27.32 real labels
Orkut [18] 3,072,441 76.28 based on Assumption 2
Facebook [24] 3,097,165 15.28 based on Assumption 2
LiveJournal [18] 3,997,962 17.35 based on Assumption 2
the size and average degree of five datasets. Additionally, we use
a dataset [15] of 1,016,275 samples of real public Facebook users
via random walk during October 2010 to evaluate the actual per-
formance of the proposed estimators. This dataset contains the ID,
exact public-degree, and exact degree of each sampled public user.
Accuracymeasure:We apply the normalized root mean square
error (NRMSE) to evaluate both the bias and variance of estimators
[5, 11, 17, 28]. NRMSE is defined by (E[( x˜x −1)2])
1
2 , where x˜ denotes
the estimation value and x denotes the true value. We performed
each experiment independently 1000 times to estimate the NRMSE.
Privacy label settings: For YouTube, Orkut, Facebook, and
LiveJournal, we independently set each privacy label as private
with probability p and otherwise public, according to Assumption
2. The probability p is from 0.0 to 0.30 in increments of 0.03 because
there were actually tens of percentages of private users [4, 7, 25].
The set of privacy labels is independently given for each experi-
ment. For Pokec, we apply the set of real privacy labels contained
in the dataset. Table 1 lists how to set privacy labels in five datasets.
Seed selection: On YouTube, Orkut, Facebook, LiveJournal, and
Pokec, the seed of a random walk is selected randomly from nodes
on the largest public-cluster and independently for each experiment.
Sample size: The sample size, i.e., the length of a random walk,
r , is 1% of the total number of nodes on YouTube, Orkut, Facebook,
and LiveJournal. On Pokec, the sample size is varied from 0.5% to
5% of the total number of nodes in increments of 0.5%.
Threshold in size estimators: The threshold,m, in size esti-
mators is 2.5% of the sample size, as set in a previous study [11].
Degree distributions: Figure 2 shows the cumulative degree
distributions of five datasets. We see that the degree distribution is
biased to low degrees in all datasets.
Coefficients αp : Figure 3 shows the coefficients αp that is de-
fined in Theorem 4.6 for various values of p in five datasets. We see
that the coefficients αp are almost equal to 1.0 for every value of p.
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Figure 6: NRMSEs of the size estimates (the ideal model with 1% sample size).
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Figure 7: NRMSEs of the average degree estimates (the ideal model with 1% sample size).
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Figure 8: NRMSEs of the size estimates (the hidden privacy model with 1% sample size).
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Figure 9: NRMSEs of the average degree estimates (the hidden privacy model with 1% sample size).
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Figure 10: NRMSEs of size convergence values.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
p
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
N
R
M
S
E
Smooth
Proposed
(a) YouTube
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
p
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
N
R
M
S
E
Smooth
Proposed
(b) Orkut
Figure 11: NRMSEs of average degree convergence values.
Relative size of the largest public-cluster: Figure 4 shows
the average relative size of the largest public-cluster, n∗n , over in-
dependent 1000 experiments for various probabilities of p in four
datasets. The upper limit is 1 − p (gray solid line). All the public
nodes on Pokec belong to the largest public-cluster.
Average absolute size of isolated public-clusters: Figure 5
shows the average absolute size of isolated public-clusters (i.e.,
public-clusters other than the largest public-cluster) over indepen-
dent 1000 experiments for various probabilities of p in four datasets.
Pokec has no isolated public-clusters.
5.2 Estimation Accuracy for Percentage of
Private Nodes
Figures 6 and 7 show the NRMSEs of each estimator for various
probabilities of p with 1% sample size in the ideal model. The NRM-
SEs of both estimators are equal whenp = 0 because of Propositions
4.4 and 4.11. The proposed estimators have lower NRMSEs for most
probabilities of p > 0 than those of the existing estimators. For ex-
ample, the proposed estimators improve the NRMSE approximately
88.1%, e.g., from 0.294 to 0.035, for p = 0.3 in Figure 7 (b). Figures 8
and 9 show that the proposed estimators improve the NRMSEs on
all four datasets in the hidden privacy model as well.
The improvement of estimation errors results from that of ex-
pected errors of convergence values. Figures 10 and 11 show the
NRMSEs of convergence values obtained from Lemmas 4.1, 4.3, 4.8
and 4.10 for various probabilities of p on YouTube and Orkut. The
NRMSEs of both estimators are equal to 0 when p = 0 because of
Propositions 4.4 and 4.11. The proposed estimators improve the
NRMSEs of convergence values for any p > 0; this supports the
claims of Corollaries 4.7 and 4.13. We have obtained similar results
on Facebook and LiveJournal.
The errors of estimation and convergence values are affected by
the relative size of the largest public-cluster because we sample the
nodes only on the largest public-cluster. On Orkut where almost
all the public nodes belong to the largest public-cluster (see Figure
4), the convergence values of proposed estimators are almost equal
to true values for any probabilities of p (see Figures 10 and 11);
this supports the claims of Theorems 4.6 and 4.12. Consequently,
the NRMSEs of estimates on Orkut do not almost increase as the
probabilities ofp increases (see Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9). Conversely, on
YouTube where there are the most public nodes that do not belong
to the largest public-cluster among four datasets, the NRMSEs of
the estimation and convergence values relatively increases.
5.3 Estimation in Real-World Datasets
We evaluate the performance of the proposed estimators in two
realistic datasets including real private users.
5.3.1 Pokec. We use the Pokec dataset [18, 25] that contains all
the graph data and real privacy labels of the Pokec network. There
are 552525 private nodes (approximately 33.8%) on the Pokec graph.
We evaluate errors of estimates and convergence values obtained
by the existing and proposed estimators using this dataset.
Figures 12 and 13 show the NRMSEs of each estimator for vari-
ous sample sizes. In both access models, the proposed estimators
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Figure 12: NRMSEs of size estimates on Pokec.
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Figure 13: NRMSEs of average degree estimates on Pokec.
Table 2: Convergence values (CV) and relative errors (RE) in
Pokec (left column), and estimates obtained from samples
of public Facebook Users (right column).
Pokec Real Facebook
Algorithm CV RE Estimate
NC 1080278.0 0.338 480298540.0
Proposed 1646880.8 0.009 656874080.9
Smooth 19.49 0.287 102.07
Proposed 28.31 0.036 137.03
improve the NRMSEs for all sample sizes. The proposed size esti-
mator particularly improves the NRMSE by approximately 92.6%,
e.g., from 0.339 to 0.025, with a 5% sample size in Figure 12 (a).
The improvement of estimation errors results from that of the
errors of convergence values. The left column in Table 2 presents
the convergence values obtained from Lemmas 4.1, 4.3, 4.8 and
4.10 and relative errors of each estimator. The proposed estimators
improve the relative errors by 97.3%, e.g., from 0.338 to 0.009, for
the size and 87.5%, e.g., from 0.287 to 0.036 for the average degree.
Moreover, the proposed estimators have convergence values that
are almost equal to the true properties of the whole Pokec graph
including private nodes. Even though Assumption 2 does not hold
for the Pokec graph, we have obtained reasonable results as claimed
in Theorems 4.6 and 4.12.
5.3.2 Real public Facebook user samples. We use a dataset [15] of
1,016,275 real public Facebook user samples obtained by a random
walk during October 2010. We can estimate the size and average
degree of Facebook as of October 2010 using existing and proposed
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Figure 14: Effects of the proposed calculation for public-
degrees on Orkut (the hidden privacymodel with 1% sample
size).
estimators, because this dataset contains the ID, exact public-degree,
and exact degree of each sampled public user.
The right column in Table 2 shows estimates of each estimator.
We set a threshold,m, in size estimators as 2.5% of the sample size,
i.e.,m = 25407. Although we cannot evaluate each error because
the true size and average degree of Facebook as of October 2010
are unknown, we believe that estimates are reasonable, considering
two findings in almost the same period.
First, Facebook reported that there were 500 million active users
as of July 2010 [8]. This suggests that there were at least 500 million
users including inactive users at that time. Notably, the estimated
size in Table 2 includes both active and inactive users. Our estimate,
i.e., 657 million, is greater than 500 million, and we speculate that
the difference (approximately 157 million) includes inactive users.
Second, Catanese et al. obtained an unbiased estimate of the pro-
portion of private users as 0.266 from uniform samples of Facebook
users in August 2010 [4]. From Lemmas 4.2 and 4.9 and Theorems
4.6 and 4.12, we can intuitively estimate the value of p, which is
almost equal to the proportion of private users, from the respective
estimates as pˆn ≜ 1 − nNCnˆ and pˆavд ≜ 1 −
dSmoothavд
dˆavд
. Here, pˆn and
pˆavд are the estimates of p obtained by the existing and proposed
estimators for the size and average degree, respectively. From Table
2, we obtain pˆn and pˆavд as 0.269 and 0.255, respectively, which
are considerably close to the ground truth value of 0.266.
5.4 Effectiveness of the Proposed
Public-Degree Calculation
We evaluate the proposed public-degree calculation for the hidden
privacy model. The proposed size estimator requires the public-
degree of each sample (see Section 4.2). Thus, we compare the size
estimation accuracy and proportion of queried nodes of the exact
and proposed methods. The exact method queries all neighbors of
each sample to use the exact public-degree in weighting.
Figure 14 shows the experimental result with a 1% sample size
on Orkut. The proposed approximation provides almost the same
estimation accuracy as the exact method (see Figure 14 (a)). The
proposed method queries approximately 1% nodes; however, the
exact method queries over 50% nodes which are much greater than
1% sample size (see Figure 14 (b)). The proposed method reduces
the proportion of queried nodes by tens of percent with almost the
same accuracy on other datasets as well.
5.5 Seed Selection from the Largest
Public-Cluster
In practical scenarios, we may require additional queries caused
by restarting a random walk from another seed in the two cases:
(1) when a selected seed is a private node and (2) when a selected
public seed is on an isolated public-cluster.
We believe that the number of queries performed in each case
is sufficiently small. For the case of (1), The proportion of private
nodes is empirically smaller than that of public nodes, e.g., 27%
on Facebook [4] and 34% on Pokec [25]. Additionally, one query
is enough to check the privacy label of a node. For the case of (2),
we believe that the number of queries is small under Assumption
2, because of the following two natures of graphs with degree
distributions biased to low degrees [2]. First, most public nodes
belong to the largest public-cluster. In our experiments, even if
p = 0.3, 99.1% , e.g., 0.6940.7 in Orkut, 91.4%, e.g.,
0.640
0.7 in LiveJournal,
82.8%, e.g., 0.5800.7 in Facebook and 76.7%, e.g.,
0.537
0.7 in YouTube
of public nodes belong to the largest public-cluster on average
(see Figure 4). Therefore, a selected public seed will belong to the
largest public-cluster with high probability. Second, the size of the
isolated public-clusters is considerably smaller than that of the
largest public-cluster. In our experiments, the average absolute size
is only approximately one for every probability of p (see Figure 5).
Therefore, few queries are performed on isolated public-clusters.
We believe that two real-world datasets support Assumption 3.
There is only the largest public-cluster on Pokec; the case of (2)
cannot occur. The samples of real public Facebook users provide
an estimated size of 657 million and contain one million unique
samples; we believe that the samples were obtained from the largest
public-cluster of Facebook as of October 2010.
6 RELATEDWORK
Crawling techniques that traverse neighbors are effective to sam-
ple graph data in OSNs where neighbor data is obtained through
queries. The breadth-first search is particularly a basic sampling
technique applied in early studies on analyzing the graph structure
of OSNs [1, 9, 10, 20, 29]. However, Gjoka et al., through the case
study of crawling in Facebook, demonstrated that the breadth-first
search with a small sample size leads to a significant sampling bias
that is difficult to correct [9, 10].
Gjoka et al. designed a practical framework to obtain unbiased es-
timates of graph properties via a randomwalk-based sampling in so-
cial networks [9, 10]. Gjoka et al. clarified that the re-weighted ran-
dom walk scheme, where each sample via random walk is weighted
to correct the sampling bias, is effective to obtain unbiased esti-
mates. In this study, we have made the framework of Gjoka et al.
more practical by addressing the effects of private nodes on the
re-weighted random walk scheme for the first time. Specifically, we
have designed a random walk-based sampling algorithm consider-
ing private nodes and proposed the weighting methods to reduce
both sampling bias and estimation errors due to private nodes.
The estimation algorithms based on the re-weighted random
walk scheme have been studied for several properties [5, 6, 11, 12,
22, 28]. The targeted properties widely range from those of the
graph such as the size and the average degree to those of the nodes
like centralities. We have designed the algorithms to accurately
estimate the size and average degree of the whole graph including
private nodes. This study has focused on estimators for only the
size and average degree; however, there is no particular reason to
be limited to these. The goal of weighting methods to reduce both
sampling bias and errors due to private nodes is shared in designing
all of the random walk-based estimators for social networks. Then,
the methodology presented in our study will help these designs.
Ye et al. investigated the effects of private nodes on general
crawling methods and empirically argued that private nodes cause
only a small reduction rate of the number of nodes and edges
that can be sampled by crawling, under Assumptions 1 and 2 [30].
However, Ye et al. did not support the validity of assumptions.
In this study, we have focused on the effects of private nodes on
random walk-based algorithms. Moreover, we have validated the
three assumptions through experiments using real-world datasets.
Kossinets experimentally discussed the effect of missing the
nodes and edges on the properties of social networks [13]. Kossinets
reported that as the proportion of randomly deleted nodes increases,
errors of the size and average degree between the original graph
and the remaining largest connected component increase. We have
theoretically analyzed these errors and designed algorithms to im-
prove them under certain assumptions and access models. The
important differences from the study of Kossinets are as follows:
(i) we can find most private nodes in neighbors of public nodes on
social networks under Assumption 1 and (ii) we can reduce the er-
rors due to private nodes by modifying the weighs for each sample
obtained from the largest public-cluster based on Assumption 2.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Wehave designed re-weighted randomwalk algorithms considering
private nodes for the first time. The previous studies have not
addressed the effects of private nodes on re-weighted random walk
algorithms because private nodes prevent us from performing a
simple randomwalk on a social graph.We have broken through this
situation by making three assumptions. In particular, Assumption 2
which is seemingly too simple has brought surprisingly reasonable
results in experiments using real-world datasets. Our study has
opened the door to accurately estimate the whole graph topology
of social networks including private nodes.
There are mainly two future works. First, we plan to strengthen
the validity of three assumptions. To further verify Assumptions 1
and 2, we should additionally test the proposed estimators in real
social networks including private nodes. To support Assumption
3 more, we will improve the sampling algorithm considering the
case that the seed is on an isolated public-cluster. Second, we plan
to design estimators considering private nodes for other properties,
such as clustering coefficients [11] and motifs (or graphlets) [5, 28].
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In the supplement, we show the pseudo code and proofs that
could not be included in the main manuscript due to space limita-
tions and the information for reproducing the experimental results.
A PSEUDO-CODE
Algorithm 1 Random walk in the hidden privacy model.
Require: seed vx1 ∈ C∗, sample size r
Ensure: sampling list R
1: R ← empty list
2: for k = 1 to r do
3: dxk ← the degree of vxk
4: dˆ∗xk ← 0
5: append (xk ,dxk , dˆ∗xk ) → R
6: if vxk has been visited for the first time then
7: axk ← 0
8: bxk ← 0
9: end if
10: flag← False
11: while flag is False do
12: vxk+1 ← a neighbor of vxk chosen randomly
13: bxk ← bxk + 1
14: if vxk+1 is a public node then
15: axk ← axk + 1
16: flag← True
17: end if
18: end while
19: end for
20: for k = 1 to r do
21: dˆ∗xk ← dxk
axk
bxk
22: end for
23: return R
Algorithm 1 describes the designed random walk-based sam-
pling using the proposed public-degree calculation in the hidden
privacymodel. The process in lines from 11 to 18 will be successfully
performed, because the k-th sample, vxk , has at least one public
neighborvxk−1 for 2 ≤ k ≤ r andvx1 is on the largest public-cluster.
Additionally, it follows that bxk > 0 for each sample vxk , because
a neighbor selection is performed at least once for each sample.
B PROOFS
We show proofs of Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.8, 4.9,
4.10, Proposition 4.4, Theorems 4.6, 4.12, and Corollary 4.7.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. First, it holds Pr [xr = i] = 0 for each node vi ∈ V \V ∗,
because we cannot reach nodes not in V ∗. Then, for each node
vi ∈ V ∗, we show that Pr [xr = i] converges to d
∗
i
D∗ after many
steps. The designed random walk started from the seed on C∗ has
the transition probability matrix P = {Pi, j }vi ,vj ∈V ∗ , where Pi, j
is 1d∗i , if (vi ,vj ) ∈ E
∗, otherwise, 0. P is ergodic because C∗ is a
connected graph, and hence, the stationary distribution uniquely
exists because of the Theorem 2.1. {pi }vi ∈V ∗ satisfies the definition
of the stationary distribution. The probability Pr [xr = i] converges
to the corresponding stationary distribution after many steps. □
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Let Xˆk (l) denote a random variable which returns 1 if a
public neighbor ofvxk is selected at the l-th trial, otherwise 0, where
1 ≤ l ≤ bxk and it holds
∑bxk
l=1 Xˆk (l) = axk . It holds Pr [Xˆk (l) = 1] =
d∗xk
dxk
because Xˆk (l) follows a Bernoulli distribution for each l . Then,
it holds E[dˆ∗xk ] = dxk
d∗xk
dxk
= d∗xk . Because {Xˆk (l)}
bxk
l=1 is a process of
independent and identically distributed trials, dˆ∗xk converges to its
expectation after many steps of the designed random walk because
of the law of large numbers. □
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. It holds Q(k) = dxk , because the exact method queries
all neighbors of each sample. Therefore, we have
E[Q] = E[Q(k)] =
∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
D∗ E[Q(k)|xk = i] =
∑
vi ∈V ∗ d∗i di
D∗ .
The first and second equations hold because of the linearity of
expectation and the law of total expectation.
Qˆ(k) follows the geometric distribution with success probability
d∗xk
dxk
, because the proposed method randomly queries neighbors
of vxk until the public neighbor is firstly selected. Thus, it holds
E[Qˆ(k)] = dxkd∗xk . Then, we have
E[Qˆ] = E[Qˆ(k)] =
∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
D∗
di
d∗i
=
∑
vi ∈V ∗ di
D∗ .
Lemma 3.3 holds because of the above equations. □
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. First, we calculate the expectation of ΦNCn :
E
[
ΦNCn
]
= E[ϕk,l ] =
∑
vi ∈V ∗
(
d∗i
D∗
)2
.
The first equation holds because of the linearity of expectation.
The second equation holds because vxk and vxl are independently
sampled with the probability d
∗
i
D∗ . Then, we obtain
E
[
ΨNCn
]
= E
[
d∗xk
d∗xl
]
=
∑
vi ∈V ∗
∑
vj ∈V ∗
d∗i
d∗j
d∗j
D∗
d∗i
D∗ = n
∗ ∑
vi ∈V ∗
(
d∗i
D∗
)2
.
We conclude that nNC converges to n∗, because ΦNCn and ΨNCn
intuitively converge to their respective expectations. □
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. We define the random variable Xn (i) = 1V ∗ (vi ) for each
node vi ∈ V . It holds n∗ = ∑vi ∈V Xn (i). The expected value of n∗
regarding Lpr i is given by:
Epr i [n∗] =
∑
vi ∈V
Epr i [Xn (i)] =
∑
vi ∈V
Pr [vi ∈ V ∗] = (1 − p)n.
The first and second equations hold because of the linearity of the
expected value and the law of total expectation. □
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. As with the proof of the Lemma 4.1, we have
E
[
Ψˆn
]
= E
[
dxk
d∗xl
]
= n∗
∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i di
(D∗)2 .
Because ΦNCn and Ψˆn intuitively converge to the expected values
respectively, nˆ converges to n˜. □
B.7 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. When there are no private nodes onG , we have V ∗ = V
and d∗i = di for each node vi ∈ V ∗, because C∗ is equivalent to G.
Thus, it holds nNC = nˆ from the definitions. It holds n∗ = n˜ = n
because of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3. □
B.8 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof. d∗i follows the binomial distribution with parameters di
and 1−p regardingLpr i , because each neighbor ofvi independently
becomes a public node with probability 1 − p. □
B.9 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Proof. We define the random variables Xˆn (i) = d∗i di1V ∗ (vi )
and Yˆn (i) = (d∗i )21V ∗ (vi ) for each node vi ∈ V . Also, let Xˆ =∑
vi ∈V ∗ d∗i di and Yˆ =
∑
vi ∈V ∗ (d∗i )2. It holds Xˆ =
∑
vi ∈V Xˆn (i) and
Yˆ =
∑
vi ∈V Yˆn (i). We obtain the expectation of Xˆ regarding Lpr i :
Epr i [Xˆ ] =
∑
vi ∈V
Pr [vi ∈ V ∗]Epr i [d∗i di ] = (1 − p)2
∑
vi ∈V
(di )2.
The second equation hold because of Lemma 4.5. We note that the
degree di is a constant regarding Lpr i . Similarly, the expectation
of Yˆ regarding Lpr i can be obtained as follows:
Epr i [Yˆ ] =
∑
vi ∈V
Pr [vi ∈ V ∗]Epr i [(d∗i )2]
= (1 − p)2
∑
vi ∈V
di [(1 − p)di + p].
Theorem 4.6 holds because of above equations and Lemma 4.2. □
B.10 Proof of Corollary 4.7
Proof. From Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.6, it is sufficient to show
that |1 − αp | ≤ p. First, we show that 1 − αp ≥ 0:
1 − αp =
p
∑
vi ∈V di∑
vi ∈V di [(1 − p)di + p]
≥ 0.
The inequality holds because it holds di ≥ 1 for each node vi ∈ V ∗
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. It holds equality when p = 0. Therefore, it is enough
to show that 1 − αp ≤ p. We have
1 − αp − p = −(1 − p)p
∑
vi ∈V [di (di − 1)]∑
vi ∈V di [(1 − p)di + p]
≤ 0.
The inequality holds since it holds di ≥ 1 for each node vi ∈ V ∗
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. □
B.11 Proof of Lemma 4.8
Proof. LetΦSmoothavд be the weighted average of 1d∗xk
for samples.
We calculate the expectation of ΦSmoothavд as follows:
E
[
ΦSmoothavд
]
= E
[
1
d∗xk
]
=
∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
D∗
1
d∗i
=
1
d∗avд
.
Because ΦSmoothavд converges to the expected value after many steps
because of Theorem 2.2, dSmoothavд converges to d∗avд . □
B.12 Proof of Lemma 4.9
Proof. We define the random variable Xavд(i) = d∗i 1V ∗ (vi ) for
each node vi ∈ V . It holds D∗ = ∑vi ∈V Xavд(i). The expected
value regarding Lpr i of D∗ can be derived:
Epr i [D∗] =
∑
vi ∈V
Pr [vi ∈ V ∗]Epr i [d∗i ] = (1 − p)2D.
Consequently, it follows that Lemma 4.9 holds because of the above
equation and Lemma 4.2. □
B.13 Proof of Lemma 4.10
Proof. Let Φˆavд = 1r
∑r
k=1
1
dxk
be the weighted average of 1dxk
for samples. Then, we have:
E[Φˆavд] = E
[
1
dxk
]
=
∑
vi ∈V ∗
d∗i
D∗
1
di
=
1
d˜avд
.
Since Φˆavд converges to the expected value after many steps be-
cause of Theorem 2.2, dˆavд converges to d˜avд . □
B.14 Proof of Theorem 4.12
Proof. We define the random variable Xˆavд(i) = d
∗
i
di
1V ∗ (vi ) for
each node vi ∈ V . Also, let Xˆavд = ∑vi ∈V ∗ d∗idi . It holds Xˆavд =∑
vi ∈V Xˆavд(i). We obtain the expectation of Xˆavд regarding Lpr i :
Epr i [Xˆavд] =
∑
vi ∈V
Pr [vi ∈ V ∗]Epr i
[
d∗i
di
]
= (1 − p)2n.
Using the fact that Epr i [D∗] = (1 − p)2D and the above equation,
we have that the Theorem 4.12 holds. □
C ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR
REPRODUCING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
All the original datasets are publicly available as follows:
YouTube: http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/com-youtube
Pokec: http://snap.stanford.edu/data/soc-Pokec.html
Orkut: https://snap.stanford.edu/data/com-Orkut.html
Facebook: http://networkrepository.com/socfb-A-anon.php
LiveJournal: https://snap.stanford.edu/data/com-LiveJournal.html
Real public Facebook user samples: http://odysseas.calit2.uci.
edu/doku.php/public:osn_datasets#facebook_weighted_random_walks
The datasets and source code that were used to generate the
results in this paper are available at https://github.com/kazuibasou/
KDD2020.
